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Abstract: The predictions that emerge from tournament theory have been tested in a number of
sports-related settings. Since sporting events involving individuals (golf, tennis, running, auto racing)
feature rank order tournaments with relatively large payoffs and easily observable outcomes, sports is
a natural setting for such tests. In this paper, we test the predictions of tournament theory using a
unique race-level data set from NASCAR. Most previous tests of tournament theory using NASCAR
data used either season level data or race level data from a few seasons. Our empirical work uses
race and driver level NASCAR data for 1114 races over the period 1975–2009. Our results support
the predictions of tournament theory: the larger the spread in prizes paid in the race, measured
by the standard deviation or interquartile range of prizes paid, the higher the average speed in the
race. Our results account for the length of the track, number of entrants, number of caution flags,
and unobservable year- and week-level heterogeneity.
Keywords: NASCAR; tournament theory; nonlinear prize structure
JEL Classification: J22; J33; L83
1. Introduction
A substantial body of literature testing the predictions of tournament theory in the context of
sport exists. Sport represents a natural setting for testing these predictions because the nonlinear prize
structure of many sporting events clearly follows the model’s predictions, the prizes are often large,
and contestant performance can readily be observed. Tests from golf, bowling, foot races, motorcycle
races, tennis, and team sports generally confirm the predictions of the model: effort depends on the
prize structure put in place by the tournament organizer.
Curiously, one setting with relatively few tests of tournament theory is stock car racing, a popular
form of automobile racing that grew from relatively humble roots in the southern United States into an
extremely popular form of car racing. Stock car racing originally referred to races featuring vehicles
that had not been modified from the original factory form. It now refers to races involving any
production-based vehicles, in contrast to cars, for example Formula 1 or drag racing, custom built for
racing purposes. Many stock car racing circuits exist in the US, Mexico, Canada, the UK, New Zealand,
and Brazil. The most popular, and most visible, stock car racing circuit is the National Association for
Stock Car Racing (NASCAR); NASCAR’s Sprint Cup Series (formerly called the NEXTEL Cup Series
and Winston Cup Series) is the premier stock car racing series in the world and has been in existence
since 1949.
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von Allmen (2001) laid out one key theoretical issue associated with the reward structure in
NASCAR, noting that the presence of large revenues generated by advertising, the season long NASCAR
points competition generating monetary incentives that extend beyond single races, some NASCAR
drivers earning significant sponsor bonuses without winning races, and also sharing race winnings
with their team, and the relatively compressed nature of race winnings in NASCAR suggest that
standard contest theory might not apply.
Instead, von Allmen argued that the “sabotage effect” model developed by Lazear (1989) in the
context of winner take all contests where one competitor in a tournament can engage in behavior
detrimental to other competitors could also apply to NASCAR races. In this context, Lazear (1989)
showed that the prize structure for eliciting maximum effort is compressed relative to the optimum
prize stricture when sabotage is not possible. Alternatively, von Allmen (2001) posited that the large
sponsorship revenues from car advertising generate incentives for consistent driver performance
rather than maximum driver effort to win races. Subsequent empirical literature focused primarily on
analyzing sabotage and consistency in NASCAR driver performance.
We perform a test of the standard contest theoretic model applied to NASCAR. Several previous
papers test the predictions of contest theory using NASCAR data. Becker and Huselid (1992) used
data from a single NASCAR racing season which limited their ability to capture variability in effort.
O’Roark et al. (2012) used data from the NASCAR post season (“the Chase”) over the 2003–2006
seasons and individual driver data. They focus on risk taking, and explain observed wrecks during
races, not driver effort. O’Roark et al. (2012) takes a similar approach. Rishel et al. (2015) analyze
variation in season points earned by individual drivers and discuss the implications of tournament
theory for this outcome, but do not estimate regression models containing a variable reflecting the
nonlinearity of the prize structure.
We argue that the prize structure of NASCAR races is sufficiently non-linear to generate contest
incentives for drivers to put forth maximum effort, despite the potential for sabotage effects during races.
We analyze the outcomes of more than 1100 NASCAR races from the 1975 to 2009 seasons. The sample
ends in 2009 because of substantial rule changes made prior to the 2010 season, including restrictor
plate changes that increased cars’ horsepower and elimination of rules against bump drafting that
substantially affected drivers’ aggressiveness on the track. These rule changes make comparisons
difficult across the two rule regimes.
Yaskewich (2017) provides a second reason for not extending the sample beyond the 2009 or
2010 NASCAR season. Prior to 2011 NASCAR allowed drivers to compete in any or all of the three
NASCAR-sponsored race series: the top Spring Cup series and the lower tier Nationwide series and
Truck series. Beginning in 2011, NASCAR required drivers to compete in only one series in any season.
Yaskewich (2017) showed that this rule change substantially changed driver behavior.
Estimates of a reduced form econometric model of driver effort show that the prize structure
in NASCAR races generates incentives for drivers to put forth more effort. The empirical results
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the spread of the prize distribution increases the
average speed of the winning car by about 2.5 miles per hour over the course of the race, controlling for
unobservable track-specific heterogeneity, week of season and year effects, and other characteristics
of races. Speed of the winning competitor represents a common proxy variable for effort in research
using data from races. As tournament theory predicts, NASCAR drivers supply more effort in races
with a larger spread in the prize distribution, other things equal.
Predictions and Tests of Tournament Theory
Frick (2003) summarized the key predictions of contest theory and surveyed the empirical tests of
the predictions of contest theory based on data from athletic contests. The basic idea behind contest
theory is that participants in a contest possess endowments of ability and talent and choose an optimal
amount of effort to put forth in the contest given the endowment of ability and talent of their competitors
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and the prize structure of the contest. The contest is assumed to be rank ordered—prizes are awarded
based on relative performance only—and the prizes known in advance are increasing in rank.
Performance in the contest depends on both the optimal effort chosen by all participants and a
random component attributed to luck and other random factors outside the control of the participant.
Since the contest has multiple competitors, the optimal choice of effort depends on the distribution of
talent and ability across the competitors and each competitor’s expectation of the effort put forth by
other participants, as well as the prize structure.
Three key testable predictions emerge from contest theory. First, optimal effort depends positively
on the size and spread of the prize distribution; second, optimal effort depends negatively on the
marginal cost of effort; third, optimal effort depends on the effect of changes in effort on the probability
of winning the tournament.
In general, empirical tests of the predictions of tournament theory focus on the relationship between
the size and structure of the prize pool in tournaments and the effort put forth by the contestants.
Sporting events represent a natural setting for testing the predictions of tournament theory because
both the effort put forth by the contestants and the size and structure of the prize pool can easily be
observed. Previous tests of the predictions of tournament theory in a sports setting include tests using
data from professional golf (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990a, 1990b; Orszag 1994; Melton and Zorn 2000),
professional bowling (Bognanno 1990), horse racing (Fernie and Metcalf 1999; Coffey and Maloney 2010),
tennis (Lallemand et al. 2008; Sunde 2009), motorcycle racing (Maloney and Terkun 2002), and foot races
(Maloney and McCormick 2000; Lynch and Zax 2000; Frick and Prinz 2007; Frick 2011). Feuillet et al. (2018)
perform a comparative test using data from golf and tennis and find no impact of the prize distribution on
effort in either sport.
von Allmen (2001) posited that other alternative models could be applied to NASCAR race
outcomes, documenting a number of features of NASCAR races that differ from other sporting events.
NASCAR drivers compete for three types of awards in each race: cash winnings based on rank order
of finish in the race, points that accrue over the course of the season and count toward a season-long
competition with a sizable monetary reward to the driver who accumulates the most points over the
course of the season, and other bonus payments for in-race accomplishments like the number of laps
lead or winning the pole position in the race. Also, many NASCAR drivers are members of multi-car
teams, and compensation from individual events can be shared with the team owner and other team
members. In addition to team membership, sponsorship revenues paid by companies who place
corporate logos on the cars also contribute heavily to the revenues earned by teams.
Each race offers a standard non-linear rank order prize structure. Beyond this standard prize
structure, several types of bonuses also apply to each race, including incentives for leading the race for
a number of laps, bonuses paid by certain equipment manufacturers if a car using their equipment
finishes among the top positions, and incentives paid to the current leader in the season-long points
competition if he wins the current race and other bonuses. Points that count toward the season long
total points competition are also awarded for rank order finish in each race. The distribution of points
awarded for order of finish in each race is relatively compressed compared to the monetary prize
structure of the race, although the payout awarded at the end of the season based on total points
earned is highly nonlinear.
In 2007, the winner of the season-long points competition, Jimmie Johnson, won $7.3 million for
finishing first in the points competition (he also won $7.6 million in individual races), the second-place
finisher in the points competition won $3.2 million and the third place finisher $2.3 million.
von Allmen (2001) pointed out that these factors, and the presence of large sponsorship revenues
derived from placing logos on cars that depend on the visibility of the car during the race and not on
the rank order finish in each race, flatten the overall reward structure over the course of a NASCAR
season, reducing the incentive for drivers to provide additional effort in specific races and also reducing
the applicability of standard tournament theory to NASCAR outcomes.
Economies 2019, 7, 102 4 of 13
Because of the compressed nature of the overall NASCAR reward structure and the possibility of
sabotage in races, von Allmen (2001) argued that Lazear (1989) model of tournaments with sabotage
can be applied to NASCAR, that the compensation structure in NASCAR was unable to generate
sufficient incentives to generate additional effort on the part of NASCAR drivers.
A small but growing literature analyzes the outcomes of car races.1 Becker and Huselid (1992)
used data from 28 races organized by NASCAR in 1990 to test the predictions of tournament theory.
Becker and Huselid (1992) analyzed the performance of 44 individual drivers in each of the 28 contests.
Their measure of effort reflected both the normalized average speed of the winning driver in each
race, where the fastest average winning speed was set equal to 1 and slower average winning speeds
assigned higher index values, and the rank order of finish for each driver. The index of average
winning speeds was multiplied by the rank order finish to generate an effort measure that is equal to 1
for the first place finisher with the highest average speed; all other drivers have effort scores larger than
one, with the value depending on both their finishing position in each race and the winning driver’s
average speed in that race relative to the fastest average winning speed in the season.
Note that this measure of effort, while varying across participants, is difficult to interpret because
it mixes absolute (average speed of the winning driver) and relative (rank order of finish) measures
of effort. It also does not preserve within-race rank ordering. Their measure of the prize structure in
NASCAR races included a variable reflecting the average difference in prizes awarded to the first 20
finishers in each race compared to drivers who finished outside the top 20. Becker and Huselid (1992)
concluded that the larger the difference in average winnings of the top 20 finishers compared to
finishers outside the top 20 in each race, the more effort put forth by drivers, holding race-specific
factors and driver ability constant. These results are consistent with the predictions of tournament
theory, in that a more unequal distribution of prize money induces greater effort by participants.
Despite the obvious limitations of the results in Becker and Huselid (1992), in terms of
the dependent variable and the use of race data from a single season, subsequent research
did not focus on testing the predictions of tournament theory using data from NASCAR races.
Additional empirical research focused on the applicability of alternative models to NASCAR race
outcomes. Depken and Wilson (2004) analyzed end of season outcomes in NASCAR over the period
1949–2001 and concluded that the relationship between the concentration of performance points and
the concentration of prize winnings supported the sabotage hypothesis.
Schwartz et al. (2007) analyzed race level NASCAR data from the 2003 and 2004 seasons
to look for additional evidence supporting the sabotage hypothesis and the inefficiency of the
NASCAR compensation scheme. They found evidence of heterogeneity in driver skills, and evidence
that less skilled drivers generate more accidents during races, supporting the sabotage hypothesis.
Groothuis et al. (2011) claimed that the monetary prize structure in NASCAR is linear, and investigated
the role of sponsorship in NASCAR; they rejected the idea that the monetary prize structure in
NASCAR is insufficient to generate incentives for NASCAR drivers to supply additional effort in races,
and instead explore the idea that consistency, providing sustained periods of camera exposure for
sponsors, drives the behavior of NASCAR drivers.
Much of the existing empirical research on outcomes in NASCAR races focuses on the idea that
the prize structure of NASCAR cannot generate sufficient contest incentives to induce drivers to supply
increased effort in races. These studies posit that the compressed prize structure, presence of the end
of season points competition, importance of sponsorship revenues, and negative consequences of
supplying additional effort in contests, either through recklessness generated by higher speeds or
sabotage, leads NASCAR drivers to pursue a goal of consistency instead of supplying maximum effort.
1 Economists have also examined the effects of uncertainty of outcome on interest in NASCAR (Berkowitz et al. 2011),
risk taking in NASCAR racing (O’Roark and Wood 2004; Sobel and Nesbitt 2007; Dole 2007; Bothner et al. 2007), the role
of sponsorship and status (Bothner et al. 2012; Groothuis et al. 2011), strategic interaction in pit stops (Deck et al. 2014),
and momentum and consistency in driver performance (Depken et al. 2017).
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In the context of the model of Lazear and Rosen (1981), in equilibrium in races with drivers of equal
ability and identical cars, all NASCAR drivers supply a similar amount of effort. Heterogeneous driver
ability or car performance will lead to different levels of effort supplied. The empirical literature on the
effects of tournament incentives on NASCAR drivers has focused on the lack of incentives to increase
effort, and the negative consequences of increases in incentives in this setting.
We return to the fundamental questions raised when applying standard tournament theory to
NASCAR racing: does NASCAR have a non-linear prize structure, and does the existing NASCAR prize
structure generate sufficient incentives for drivers to supply additional effort? Using a comprehensive
data set from 1114 NASCAR races over the period 1975–2009, we find that the monetary prize structure
of individual NASCAR races is non-linear, and that drivers appear to supply additional effort as the
prize structure becomes more dispersed, consistent with the predictions of tournament theory.
2. Materials and Methods
Our data come from all 1114 NASCAR races run in the 1975 through 2009 racing seasons.
We collected data on the outcomes of each race, including the money and points earned by each
participant, from the NASCAR web site (www.nascar.com). The NASCAR web site contains the official
results of all races since 1975, including the starting position, finishing position, status, points earned,
winnings, and laps raced by each driver in each race. It also contains other race-related data including
the average speed of the winning car, the margin of victory of the winner, the number of lead changes
in the race, the number of caution flags, and the number of laps raced under caution flags during each
race. We augmented these data with information about the tracks that each race took place on, in terms
of the length and configuration.
Table 1 summarizes the relevant variables from these 1114 NASCAR races. We deflated winnings
to real 2009 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for All Urban Consumers. We use the
average speed of the winning car in miles per hour as our measure of effort in NASCAR races.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Average Speed Winning Car 118.41 27.11 66.10 188.35
Total Winnings 2,207,711 2,262,556 115,172 16,900,000
Interquartile Range Winnings 23.43 15.12 2.01 84.80
Standard Deviation of Winnings 3.07 3.27 0.45 43.98
Number of Entrants 40 4.5 22 50
Number of Caution Flags 7 3.5 0 22
Length of a Lap 1.519 0.721 0.533 2.66
Oval Track Shape 0.34 - - -
D or Quad Oval Track Shape 0.44 - - -
Tri Oval Track Shape 0.09 - - -
Road Course Track 0.07 - - -
Other empirical research testing the predictions from tournament theory using data from racing also
use variables related to the speed of the winning participant as an effort proxy. Becker and Huselid (1992)
use average winning speed as the effort proxy in their study using NASCAR data. Lynch and Zax (2000),
Maloney and McCormick (2000), and Frick and Prinz (2007) all use winning time or time per mile for
the winning runner in foot races as an effort proxy.
The average speed of the winning car exhibits quite a bit of variation. This is due in part to the
number of caution—or yellow—flags that take place during NASCAR races and the number of laps
raced under a caution flag. A yellow caution flag is signaled during a NASCAR race when there is
some hazard on the course. The most common reason for a caution flag is an accident, but it may
also be due to debris on the track or inclement weather. Under a yellow flag all cars slow down and
follow a pace car; passing is not permitted under caution flags. The race continues at a reduced speed
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until the reason for the caution flag is removed. Only 11 races in the sample, about 1%, featured no
caution flags.
The median margin of victory in this sample is 1.19 s, and the margin of victory at the 75th
percentile is just 3.84 s, so the leaders in almost all races finish very close to each other. The mean
margin of victory is 5.9 s, but this is skewed by a small number of races (86) decided by more than
two minutes.
The average real purse size in the sample is just over $2.2 million. Purse size has clearly grown over
time; the average real purse in 1976 was $430,000 and the average real purse in 2006 was $5.43 million.
We use two different measures of the dispersion of winnings in races: the interquartile range of
winnings and the standard deviation of winnings. Both will increase as the prize structure of the race
becomes more non-linear. We measure the interquartile range in 1000s of dollars, and the standard
deviation in 10,000s of dollars in order to generate easy to express parameter estimates. Note that both
the interquartile range and the standard deviation of the prize structure vary considerably within the
sample. This variation occurs because the average purse size has grown and because different races
use different prize structures and change these prize structures over time.
The number of cars participating in a race will affect the speed, both because of the physical space
occupied by the cars and because of strategic interaction among competitors. The number of entrants
in each race varies both over time, and within seasons. The average field size in the 1970s was about
35 cars; this number has increased steadily over time; since the late 1990s most NASCAR race fields
have contained 43 cars.
The average speed of the winning car is clearly influenced by driver effort. It can also be
affected by characteristics of the track that the race takes place on. NASCAR race tracks vary in
terms of length and configuration. The average length of a NASCAR track is 1.5 miles. The shortest
track, Bristol International Speedway, is just over a half mile in length; the longest track, Talladega
Superspeedway, is nearly five times as long. The length of the track determines how many turns are in
the race, which tends to slow speeds.
NASCAR tracks have four basic forms: a standard oval with two equal length straight stretches, a D
oval with one long straight stretch, a quad oval with one long straight stretch and three shorter straight
stretches, a tri-oval with three equal length straight stretches, and ‘road course’ tracks with many
irregular turns. Only three ‘road course’ tracks have been used in NASCAR: Riverside International
Raceway, Sears Point/Infineon Raceway, and Watkins Glen International. The three tri oval tracks
are Phoenix International Raceway, Pocono Raceway, and Talladega Superspeedway. Most NASCAR
tracks are either ovals or D or Quad ovals. Each basic form provides different combinations of turns
and straightaways, which will affect the speed of the cars.
Our data come from a large number of NASCAR seasons. The tracks in use changed somewhat
over the sample period. We analyze data from 29 different racetracks. Twelve racetracks were in use
continually, or nearly continually, in the sample period accounting for 73% of the sample observations.
Eight appear only in the second half (post-1990) of the sample, accounting for 10% of the observations.
Four were in use only in the first half of the sample, accounting for 6% of the observations. An additional
five hosted races in both halves of the sample, but hosted a large majority of their races in the earlier or
later period.
2.1. NASCAR Prize Structure
A number of previous papers argued that NASCAR races have a compressed prize structure.
We have data on the prize structure, expressed in constant 2009 dollars, of all 1114 NASCAR races run
over a 34 year period, a long enough period to assess the non-linearity of the prize structure. Table 2
summarizes the average amount won by place for the first 10 finishers in NASCAR races over this
period. Over this period, the winner of NASCAR races took home just under $190,000. This figure
includes all bonuses earned by drivers in each race. The second place driver took home almost $124,000
on average, about $65,500 less. Put another way, the first place driver in a NASCAR race earned more
Economies 2019, 7, 102 7 of 13
than 50% more than the second place driver, and the second place driver earned almost 25% more
than the third place driver. The third place driver earned about half the amount that the winning
driver earned.
Table 2. NASCAR prize structure 1975–2009.
Place Average Amount Won Difference % Increase
1 $189,244 $65,535 53%
2 $123,709 $23,997 24%
3 $99,712 $15,584 19%
4 $84,129 $8855 12%
5 $75,274 $9247 14%
6 $66,027 $4282 7%
7 $61,745 $3357 6%
8 $58,388 $1893 3%
9 $56,495 −$481 −1%
10 $56,976
The “bumpiness” in prize structure noted by von Allmen (2001) can clearly be seen in Table 2.
The percentage increase in winnings from moving up one place in the standings does not diminish
uniformly, and due to bonuses the 10th place drivers actually earned a bit more than the 9th place
drivers in this sample. Beyond 10th place the prize structure in NASCAR levels out considerably,
much like in other settings like professional golf. However, Table 2 clearly indicates that the actual
monetary prize structure of individual NASCAR races held over the period 1975–2009 was non-linear,
with the returns to moving up one place in the standings increasing significantly in the top five positions.
While sponsorship, team contracts, and other factors might erode the effective prize structure,
the information provided in Table 2 suggests that NASCAR has a non-linear prize structure for
individual races. The key empirical issue focuses on the incentives generated by this non-linear prize
structure: does it provide enough of an incentive to get drivers to increase their effort over the course
of a NASCAR race?
2.2. Empirical Analysis
We examine the relationship between the effort put forth by NASCAR drivers and the prize
structure of individual races. In order to investigate this relationship, we estimate a linear reduced
form model of the determination of effort put forth in NASCAR races, e, in season t in race i during
week j at track k. The empirical model is
eijkt = α1at + α2bj + β1TCk + β2RCijt + µijkt (1)
where eijkt is the effort put forth in the race, captured by the average speed of the winning car. at is a
vector of year dummy variables capturing all factors that affect the outcome of all NASCAR races in
season t. NASCAR has undergone numerous rule changes over the 1979–2009 period, and this year
dummy variable captures the overall environment facing NASCAR drivers in each season. For example,
technological changes over time have increased the average speed in NASCAR races, and improvements
in equipment and pit crews may keep more cars in races, compressing the distribution of finishing
times. The average speed of the winning car in our sample was under 115 miles per hour (MPH) in the
1970s and early 1980s and increased to well over 120 MPH in the late 1990s.
NASCAR frequently implements rules to enhance uniformity in equipment that may also change
racing speeds over time. Any rules or conditions that apply to all NASCAR races in a particular season
will be captured by these year indicator variables. bj is a vector of week-of-season indicator variables
that captures systematic changes in incentives for drivers to provide effort over the course of the
NASCAR season.
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The season-long points competition evolves over time, and the standings in the point competition
might affect the incentives to put forth effort systematically from week to week. In addition, other
factors could change systematically over the course of the NASCAR season, like the amount of time
that elapses from one race to the next and the distance between racetracks. The week dummy variables
capture the effects of these factors on effort.
TCk is a vector of track-specific characteristics. The characteristics of tracks, including their layout
and length, affect the speed of races that take place on these tracks. This vector includes the length of a
lap at each track and indicators for the general shape of each track. The standard oval shape is the
omitted category.
RCijt is a vector of characteristics of the individual races that affect effort. This vector includes
measures of the dispersion of the real monetary prize structure of each race, and other characteristics
of each race like the number of entrants and the number of caution flags that occurred during the race.
α1, α2, β1, and β2 are unknown parameters to be estimated.
µijkt is an unobservable random error term that captures all other factors that affect the effort put
forth by NASCAR drivers. These factors include the inherent random component of effort postulated
by tournament theory as well as other random and unobservable factors affecting effort. We assume
that this random error term is independent and identically distributed with mean zero, although
we allow the variance of this random error term to vary across races. We estimate the unknown
parameters of Equation (1) using the Ordinary Least Squares estimator with the usual Huber–White
‘sandwich’ correction for heteroscedasticity. The standard F-statistic from a Breusch–Pagan test for
heteroscedasticity rejected the null of homoscedasticity with a p-value of 0.06. Technically, we estimate
a two-way fixed effect model, since we control for unobservable heterogeneity across seasons and
across weeks of the season.
3. Results
Table 3 contains parameter estimates, asymptotic t-statistics on a two-tailed test of the null
hypothesis that the estimated parameter is equal to zero for each parameter, and other standard
regression diagnostics for several versions of Equation (1). Again, these results correct for
heteroscedasticity using the standard Huber–White ‘sandwich’ correction. The measure of the
dispersion of the monetary prize structure in each race is the interquartile range of the monetary prize
structure of each race. This is the difference between the first and third quartiles of the real monetary
prize distribution, in thousands of 2009 dollars.
Models 1 and 2 establish the basic relationship between the dispersion of the monetary prize
structure and effort, as measured by the average speed of the winning car in each race. All of the
parameter estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level and the models explain between
75% and 85% of the observed variation in average speed of the winning car. The estimated parameters
on the track characteristics have plausible and intuitively appealing signs. The longer each lap at a
track is, the higher the average speed of the winning car, other things being equal. Longer tracks have
longer straight sections of track, which allow drivers to drive faster. The omitted track shape is a
standard oval, and the results suggest that D or Quad oval tracks and tri-oval tracks produce higher
average winning speeds, other things equal. Race Course tracks like Watkins Glen, with their many
curves and irregular setup, produce markedly lower average winning speeds, roughly 50 miles per
hour slower than those on oval tracks.
The parameters of interest in Table 3 are the ones on the interquartile range of the monetary
prize structure, and these parameter estimates reflect the effect of the incentives generated by a
non-linear prize structure on effort, as reflected by the average speed of the winning car in each
race. These parameter estimates are all positive and significantly different from zero at the 5% level,
suggesting that the more variable the prize structure in a NASCAR race, the more effort drivers put
forth in that race. We interpret this as supporting the predictions of tournament theory.
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The estimated sign and significance of the parameter on the interquartile range variable is not
sensitive to the inclusion of other race specific control variables, the number of entrants and the number
of caution flags during the race. The estimated parameters on these two race characteristics have
appropriate signs and are statistically different from zero. Each additional entrant in a NASCAR race
is associated with an increase in the average speed of the winning car in that race of between 1.7 and
2.2 miles per hour. The expansion of NASCAR field size over time appears to have increased the effort
put forth by drivers. Each additional caution flag during the course of a race was associated with
a decrease in the average speed of the winning car by about 2.1 miles per hour. Since caution flags
require drivers to slow down and not to pass, this should clearly reduce the average speed in the race.
Table 3. Dispersion of prize structure affects average winning speed.
Dependent Variable: Average Winning Speed
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Interquartile Range 0.233 0.279 0.161 0.184 0.173 0.143
3.30 3.45 2.51 2.55 3.05 2.25
Lap Length 27.84 30.43 24.01 25.82 19.66 22.02
37.74 30.70 29.63 24.49 14.21 22.70
D or Quad Oval Track 11.87 10.11 10.28 8.953 8.032 7.096
11.41 8.89 10.53 8.53 9.46 7.74
Tri Oval Track 9.29 9.64 7.01 7.834 4.299 4.669
5.94 4.83 4.08 3.71 2.61 2.33
Race Course Track −49.69 −49.70 −49.54 −48.88 −52.62 −52.77
−33.32 −29.60 −31.61 −29.00 −35.13 −32.68
# of Entrants - - 1.771 1.653 2.235 2.135
- - 10.14 9.01 14.21 12.85
# of Caution Flags - - - - −2.151 −2.114
- - - - −17.19 −17.77
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.752 0.786 0.782 0.807 0.832 0.853
N 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
Asymptotic robust t-statistics shown below parameter estimates.
Interquartile range is not the only possible measure of the non-linearity of the monetary prize
structure of NASCAR races. To assess the robustness of the results reported in Table 3, we used
an alternative measure of the dispersion of the monetary prize structure of each race, the standard
deviation of the winnings paid to each participant in the race. Table 4 contains the results from
estimating Equation (1) using this alternative measure of the dispersion of the monetary prize structure
of races.
The results displayed in Table 4 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. The larger the
dispersion of the prize structure, as measured by the standard deviation of the prize money for each
race, the more effort is put forth by drivers in that race, other things being equal. The only difference
between the results in Table 4 and those in Table 3 is that the estimated parameter on the standard
deviation of the prize structure for Model 1 is not statistically different from zero.
We also estimated all the models reported on Tables 3 and 4 including a variable reflecting the
total value of the prize pool for each race. The size of the total purse could also induce more driver
effort in races. The results are robust to the inclusion of this variable. The estimated parameters on the
total purse variable in these models were generally not statistically different from zero.
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Table 4. Alternative dispersion of prize structure measure.
Dependent Variable: Average Winning Speed
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Standard Deviation 0.159 0.321 0.282 0.358 0.291 0.249
of Prize Structure 1.19 1.87 2.01 2.27 2.53 1.95
Lap Length 28.56 31.37 24.19 26.13 19.88 22.29
38.78 32.66 29.98 25.20 26.52 23.40
D or Quad Oval Track 11.99 10.28 10.28 8.999 8.033 7.134
11.54 9.12 10.52 8.57 9.46 7.76
Tri Oval Track 8.633 8.949 6.708 7.451 3.961 4.345
5.52 4.52 3.91 3.55 2.41 2.19
Race Course Track −50.77 −50.82 −49.98 −49.27 −53.12 −53.13
34.02 −30.40 −32.48 −29.56 −36.14 −33.35
# of Entrants - - 1.820 1.709 2.288 2.178
- - 10.34 9.31 14.38 13.09
# of Caution Flags - - - - −2.147 −2.117
- - - - −17.23 −17.84
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.749 0.783 0.782 0.807 0.832 0.853
N 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
Asymptotic t-statistics shown below parameter estimates.
4. Conclusions
While the estimated parameters on the interquartile range variable are statistically significant,
their relative size compared to the size of the estimated parameters on some other variables might
lead readers to question the economic significance of these parameters. To illustrate the economic
significance of these results, consider the estimated contribution made by the spread of the prize
structure to the average speed in two races held at Talladega Superspeedway, a tri-oval racetrack.
In 1980, the interquartile range of this race was $9724, roughly one standard deviation below the mean
displayed in Table 1; in 1989 the interquartile range had increased to $23,313, which is roughly at the
mean in Table 1. Based on the results from Model 4 of Table 3, which contains both year and week
fixed effects and a control for the number of entrants, the interquartile range of the prize distribution in
that range contributed to an increase in the average speed of the winning car of about 1.79 miles per
hour in 1980. The interquartile range of the prize structure in the 1989 race contributed to an increase
in the average winning speed of about 4.29 miles per hour. The difference, which shows the effect on
the average winning speed of a move from about one standard deviation below the mean interquartile
range to the mean, is 2.5 miles per hour.
Becker and Huselid (1992) treated the number of caution flags in the race as uncorrelated with the
equation error term. However, a case can be made that the number of caution flags in a race depends
on incentives to supply effort during a race, and thus could be correlated with the unobservable error
term in Equation (1). The idea is that the more effort is supplied by drivers, the greater the potential for
an accident, which would lead to a caution flag. This concept is closely related to the sabotage incentive
posited by von Allmen (2001). If the number of caution flags is correlated with the unobservable
error term, then the OLS estimator used here is neither unbiased nor consistent. The usual remedy
for this problem is to identify an instrument that is correlated with the number of caution flags and
uncorrelated with the unobservable error term in Equation (1) and use the instrumental variables (IV)
estimator. However, finding an appropriate instrument may be difficult in this context. Note that the
significance of the estimated parameter on the prize spread variable does not change when the number
of caution flags is dropped from the regression model, suggesting that any existing correlation between
the number of caution flags and the equation error term does not lead to severe econometric problems
in this case.
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Beginning in the 2004 season, NASCAR introduced a form of post-season competition, called “the
Chase” into the racing schedule. This 10-race postseason competition might generate different
incentives throughout the season. We estimated all of the model specifications shown above with an
indicator variable for racing seasons that included “the Chase” at the end of the season. The inclusion
of this indicator variable did not have any effect on the estimated parameters on the prize distribution
spread displayed in Tables 3 and 4 above.
The results above support the idea that the prize structure in NASCAR races generates incentives
for drivers to provide more effort in races, confirming one of the main predictions of tournament theory.
As noted by von Allmen (2001) and others, the prize structure in NASCAR races is more compressed
than the prize structure in professional golf, tennis, and some other individual sports. The results
presented here suggest that NASCAR drivers respond to incentives generated by prize structures with
less dispersion than found in professional golf and tennis. This leads to the question of how much
spread is required in a prize distribution to induce increased effort by participants. Since NASCAR
drivers respond to a smaller spread than professional golfers, a further examination of prize structure
and effort in order to determine how much spread is required in the prize money distribution to induce
contest effects appears warranted.
Since NASCAR drivers respond to the incentives generated by the prize structure of races, and
a large amount of detailed data on these races exist, further research in this area would be fruitful.
We use the average speed of the winning car as a measure of effort. Institutional characteristics of
NASCAR races provide alternative methods of measuring effort. For example, drivers qualify for races
during preliminary competitions the week before the race. These qualifying competitions take place
on the same track, with no other competitors present; the top speed recorded by each driver during
qualifying is used to seed the drivers at the start of the main race. These qualifying times and places
provide a measure of the ability of the driver and car going into the race in absolute terms and relative
to the other competitors. These qualifying times and starting positions could be used to construct a
driver-specific measure of effort in each race and used to test similar predictions from tournament
theory. Also, NASCAR sponsors five other stock car racing series in addition to the Sprint Cup Series,
and prize structures and outcomes from these series could also be analyzed.
Finally, the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series features both prizes for individual races and a season long
points competition. In this competition, points are awarded based on order of finish; the distribution
of points is quite compressed, but the prize distribution for the point competition is highly non-linear.
The existence of two different prize payouts in NASCAR generates a race-within-a-race that may provide
different incentives to drivers. To date, only Depken and Wilson (2004) and Schwartz et al. (2007) have
examined the interaction between prizes in individual races and the season long points competition.
Given the evidence developed here that drivers respond to the prize structure in individual races,
a closer look at the relationship between these two competitions and the incentives generated by them
appears warranted.
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